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First Time for Everything: The CFPB Enforces Data 
Security 
 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
In March 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”) filed its first data security enforcement action against Iowa- 
based fintech firm, Dwolla, Inc. (“Dwolla”).1 The consent order  
resulting from this action details how Dwolla’s data security statements 
were deceptive, and orders Dwolla to implement a host of new  
measures aimed at better protecting its customers’  personal 
information.2 This action raises many new questions surrounding the 
CFPB’s role in policing data security, and how this agency’s actions 
will compare to those pursued by other regulators, including the 
similarly situated Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).3 In the absence 
of further actions and guidance, “covered persons”4 should look to the 
recommendations outlined in the Dwolla consent order, because, as of 
now, it remains the most useful source for predicting how the CFPB  
will regulate data security in the future.5 
Financial institutions often possess vast amounts of consumer 
information, the value of which places them amongst the most popular 
targets for cyber attack.6  On the black market credit card numbers can 
 
1. Dwolla, Inc. CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0007 *1 (Mar. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Dwolla 
Consent Order]. 
2. Id. 
3. See WILL DURBIN & YENISEY RODRIGUEZ, PAUL WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & 
GARRISON LLP, THE CFPB ENTERS THE CYBERSECURITY ARENA WITH ITS FIRST 
ENFORCEMENT ACTION 4 (2016), 
https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3377203/4mar16cyberalert.pdf. 
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2015) (“The term ‘covered person’ means—(A) any person that 
engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service; and (B) any 
affiliate of a person described in subparagraph (A) if such affiliate acts as a service provider 
to such person.”). 
5. See Durbin & Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 4 (“Among other sources, companies 
should look to the remedial actions that the CFPB required of Dwolla for guidance on how 
to strengthen their systems.”). 
6. IBM, 2016 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY 7 (2016), 
https://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en/sel03094usen/SEL03094USEN.PDF. 
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sell for $15 each, while more comprehensive “Fullz”7 information 
packages can sell for twice that.8 As a result of storing such valuable 
information, companies in the financial sector experience above average 
remediation costs when data breaches  do  occur.9  Industry  observers 
note that the occurrence rate of data breaches is increasing, with 554 
million consumer records compromised in the first half of 2016 alone.10 
Over the course of the last decade, the average cost of corporate data 
breaches has also increased, from $3.5 million in 2006 to an estimated 
$7 million in 2016.11 Nearly 15% of this cost is associated with legal 
defense services, while a loss of customer confidence accounts for about 
40% of the cost.12 
Preventing these attacks can be difficult, as cybercriminals are 
constantly adapting their methods of attack.13 While the recent shift to 
EMV14 credit card chip technology has improved the security of card- 
present transactions, this change has also had the unanticipated effect of 
increasing the amount of digital financial fraud.15 Experts predict that 
cybercriminals will begin to shift focus to the financial sector’s growing 
number of non-traditional institutions, such as mobile payment  systems 
 
7. “Fullz” includes “identity information, which can include full name, email address 
and password, physical address, phone number, date of birth, Social Security Number, 
driver’s license number, bank name, bank account number, bank routing number, victim 
employer’s name.” LILLIAN ABLON ET AL., RAND CORP.,  MARKETS  FOR  CYBERCRIME 
TOOLS AND STOLEN DATA 49 (2014), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR610/RAND_RR61 
0.pdf. 
8. CHARLES MCFARLAND ET AL., MCAFEE, THE HIDDEN DATA ECONOMY 5 (2015), 
http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-hidden-data- 
economy.pdf?clickid=RsiVUn3BAVPg1wUwJ52— 
UvmUkkTQ5zExAN380&lqmcat=Affiliate:IR:null:74047:10078:10078:null&sharedid=. 
9. See IBM, supra note 6, at 7 (illustrating that the financial industry has an above 
average per capita breach cost) 
10. Gemalto Releases Findings of First Half 2016 Breach Level Index, GEMALTO 
(September 20, 2016) http://www.gemalto.com/press/Pages/Gemalto-releases-findings-of- 
first-half-2016-Breach-Level-Index.aspx. 
11. IBM, supra note 6, at 6. 
12. IBM, supra note 6, at 16. 
13. See Penny Crossman, Are You Ready for the Cybersecurity Challenges of 2016?, 
AM. BANKER (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/are-you-ready-for-the- 
cybersecurity-challenges-of-2016 (writing how new technologies can spur new methods of 
cyberattack). 
14. EMV stands for Europay, MasterCard and Visa, which have collectively developed 
the new standard credit cards, which utilize harder-to-counterfeit chips rather than  
traditional magnetic strips. Oren Levy, Europay, MasterCard, Visa: A Primer, TECHCRUCH 
(May 12, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/05/12/europay-mastercard-visa-a-primer/. 
15. Crossman, supra note 13. 
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and transfer products.16 
The CFPB was established in 2011 as part of the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).17 
The purpose of the CFPB is to enforce federal consumer financial laws 
on behalf of consumers, and to ensure that markets for consumer 
financial products and services are “fair, transparent, and  
competitive.”18 Interpreting this delegation of power broadly, the CFPB 
regulates traditional financial institutions in addition to a diverse range 
of groups traditionally conceptualized as being non-financial (i.e. 
merchants, retailers, and real estate agents.)19 The CFPB also has 
authority to police a variety of “enumerated consumer laws,” including 
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, the Truth in Savings Act, and the 
Consumer Leasing Act.20 In addition, the CFPB has the primary 
authority to enforce federal consumer financial laws over depository 
institutions with assets greater than $10 billion.21 
This Note analyzes the implications of the Dwolla enforcement 
action, and proceeds in four parts. Part II examines the findings and 
recommendations made by the CFPB in the Dwolla Consent Order.22 
Part III outlines how other federal and state regulators have policed data 
security, with a focus on the FTC’s enforcement.23  Finally, Parts IV   
and V discuss the practical implications of Dwolla and the steps that 
financial institutions should take to avoid similar enforcement actions.24 
 
 
16. Crossman, supra note 13. 
17. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) 
§ 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2015) (establishing the purpose, objectives, and function of the 
CFPB). 
18. Dodd-Frank § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2015); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL (Oct. 2012) 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual- 
v2.pdf. 
19. Dodd-Frank § 1024, 12 USC § 5514 (2015); MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, THE 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT TO EXPECT (Jan. 2012), 
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/lit_whitepaper_consumerfinancialprotectionbureau_jan 
2012.pdf at 5. 
20. ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, THE DODD-FRANK ACT ESTABLISHES THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AS THE PRIMARY REGULATOR OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 2 (July 2010), http://files.arnoldporter.com/advisory—the_dodd- 
frank_act_establishes_the_consumer_financial_protection_bureau_071510.pdf. 
21. Id. at 6. 
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See infra Part III. 
24. See infra Part IV & V. 
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II. DWOLLA GOES FIRST 
 
Founded in 2010, Dwolla offers digital money transferring 
services similar to those provided by PayPal and Venmo.25 Dwolla users 
can transfer money both to and from accounts managed entirely online, 
accessible through a variety of digital platforms.26 The money stored in 
a Dwolla account can be transferred directly to the consumer’s bank 
account or stored indefinitely in the user’s Dwolla-managed account.27 
The money stored in Dwolla-managed accounts is held in bank accounts 
managed by Compass Bank and Veridian Credit Union.28 When  users 
register  for an  account, they  are asked  to provide 
their name, address, date of birth, and Social Security number.29 This 
information is stored by Dwolla both for communication purposes and 
for use in subsequent transactions.30 Customers are asked to provide a 
routing number and an account number if they elect to link a separate 
bank account.31 At the time of this enforcement action, Dwolla had 
approximately 653,000 users and was transferring approximately $5 
million a day.32 
The main assertion of the CFPB’s enforcement action is that 
Dwolla engaged in “deceptive acts and practices relating to false 
representation regarding respondent’s data security practices in  
violation of Sections 1031(a) and 1036(a)(1) of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Act of 2010.”33 
After establishing jurisdiction and definitions, the consent order 
summarizes the findings of the CFPB’s investigation of Dwolla’s data 
security policy.34 The deceptive acts at issue in this matter took place 
from January 2011 to March 2014.35  Seven deceptive representations 
 
25. Our Story, DWOLLA, INC., https://www.dwolla.com/press (last visited Jan. 24, 
2017). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *4. 
29. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *4. 
30. See DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *4 (establishing what contact 
information Dwolla user’s must provide during registration). 
31. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *4. 
32. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *5. 
33. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *1. 
34. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *1–10 (“The Bureau has jurisdiction 
over this matter under Sections 1053 and 1055 of the CFPA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5563 and 5565.”). 
35. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *5. 
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are listed, all of which were claims made by Dwolla on its website.36 
These representations included claims that customer data was “securely 
encrypted and stored,” and that Dwolla utilized “the latest encryption 
and secure connections” technologies.37 Elsewhere, Dwolla claimed its 
security practices “exceed[ed] industry standards” and set “a new 
precedent for the industry for safety and security.”38 
The consent order also details a simulated attack previously 
conducted by Dwolla during which 62% of its employees clicked on a 
vulnerable link, and 25% of its employees gave up access to customer 
information.39 Despite these results, Dwolla failed to train employees or 
take any other affirmative steps to prevent such attacks.40 The CFPB 
does not allege that an actual data breach took place, nor does it allege 
anyone ever attempted to retrieve consumer data from Dwolla’s 
servers.41 
The CFPB issued Dwolla a $100,000 penalty, which is an 
extraordinarily low figure compared to monetary penalties issued by the 
CFPB in the past.42 All of the penalties resulting from this action went 
into the CFPB’s general Civil Penalty Fund, which is used to 
compensate victims in other enforcement actions brought by the 
agency.43 To put this figure in perspective, in 2014 over 40% of the 
CFPB’s actions resulted in penalties in excess of $5 million, with two 
exceeding $10 million.44 One of the CFPB’s largest settlements came in 
2007 when Bank of America agreed to pay $727 million for a variety of 
violations, including deceptive marketing of its credit card products.45 
 
36. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *6. 
37. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *6. 
38. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *5. 
39. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *8. 
40. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *8. 
41. See DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *8 (failing to mention any breaches 
or attempts to breach Dwolla’s servers). 
42. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *16. 
43. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *16; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
Civil Penalty Fund, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/payments-harmed- 
consumers/civil-penalty-fund/. 
44. JOSEPH L. BARLOON, ANAND S. RAMAN & AUSTIN K. BROWN, SKADDEN, ARPS, 
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, CFPB DEFINES ‘UNFAIR,’ ‘DECEPTIVE’ AND ‘ABUSIVE’ 
PRACTICES THROUGH ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/cfpb-defines-unfair-deceptive-and-abusive-practices- 
through-enforcement-activity. 
45. CFPB Orders Bank of America to Pay $727 Million in Consumer Relief for Illegal 
Credit Card Practices, CONSUMER    FIN. PROT. BUREAU    (Apr. 9, 2014), 
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Alternatively, the relatively small penalty issued to Dwolla could be due 
to the unprecedented nature of this action.46 Furthermore, the small 
penalty potentially could have been strategic, in that it may have 
discouraged Dwolla from litigating the validity of this unprecedented 
action.47 
For Dwolla, implementing the changes mandated in the consent 
order will likely exceed the cost of the monetary fine.48 The order 
somewhat broadly instructs Dwolla to “adopt and implement reasonable 
and appropriate data security measures to protect consumers’ personal 
information.”49 The CFPB further requires that Dwolla “improve the 
safety and security of its operations and the consumer information that  
is stored on, or transmitted through  its  networks.”50  To  accomplish 
these improvements the consent order provides some specific steps that 
Dwolla must take, including the establishment of a data security plan 
and the hiring of “a qualified person” to coordinate and account for 
Dwolla’s data security.51 The consent order also requires Dwolla to 
conduct two annual network security assessments, after which any 
identified issues are remedied.52 
The order further provides that Dwolla must report certain 
information to the CFPB for a period of at least five years.53 These 
reports must include a list of employees handling data security issues as 
well as any training materials, risk assessments, or advertisements 
relating to data security.54 While five years of reporting may seem 
excessive, it pales in comparison to data security actions brought by 
other agencies, some of which consist of decades of direct supervision.55 
 
 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-bank-of-america-to-pay- 
727-million-in-consumer-relief-for-illegal-credit-card-practices/. 
46. See DURBIN & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3 (stressing the fact that this is the first data 
security related action brought by the CFPB). 
47. See DURBIN & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3 
48. See DURBIN & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3 (listing the multiple steps that have to be 
taken by Dwolla to comply with the consent order). 
49. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *11. 
50. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *11. 
51. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *12. 
52. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *12. 
53. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *19. 
54. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *19–20. 
55. See Fandango, Credit Karma Settle FTC Charges That They Deceived Consumers 
by Failing to Securely Transmit Sensitive Personal Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N,  
(Mar.  28,  2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/03/fandango-credit- 
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In the short term, the order instructs Dwolla to submit a 
compliance report within 90 days,56 and conduct a data security audit 
within 180 days.57 During the audit, Dwolla must allow a “qualified 
person” to evaluate the effectiveness of the policies being implemented, 
who will then report whether Dwolla is complying with the consent 
order.58 In the event that the requirements of this consent order are not 
met, there are procedures by which the CFPB can extend the duration of 
its supervision.59 
 
III. REGULATING IN A CROWDED FIELD 
 
The legal landscape governing data security is crowded, with 
forty-seven laws relating to data breach notification alone.60  Relevant   
to financial institutions, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”), Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”), and Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) all regulate data security in some 
capacity.61 Collectively, these agencies have acted on data security in 
their roles as members of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (“FFIEC”).62 These agencies have also issued independent data 
security guidance and regulations, the focus of which varies based on 
their respective powers and jurisdiction.63 
 
 
karma-settle-ftc-charges-they-deceived-consumers. 
56. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *14, 18. 
57. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *12. 
58. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *14. 
59. DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, at *15-16. 
60. Judith Germano, Proposed New York Cybersecurity Regulation: A Giant Leap 
Backward?, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2016, 2:32 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/12/02/proposed-ny-cybersecurity-regulation-a- 
giant-leap-backward/#61367f462e78. 
61. See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Agencies Issue 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards 
(Oct.19, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20161019a.htm 
(discussing a recent proposed rule set forth by these agencies). 
62. DEBOVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, CLIENT UPDATE: FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATORS 
TO PROPOSE ENHANCED CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARDS (Oct. 25, 2016), 
http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2016/10/20161025_federal_fi 
nancial_regulators_to_propose_enhanced_cyber_risk_management_standards.pdf. 
63. See, e.g., JEFFREY SACKS, CROWE HORWATH LLP, FDIC INTREX PROGRAM IS HERE 
(Sept. 6 2016), http://www.crowehorwath.com/cybersecurity-watch/fdic-intrex- 
program/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Crowe 
CybersecurityWatch+%28Crowe+Cybersecurity+Watch%29 (discussing a program 
instituted by the FDIC, applying narrowly to insitutions covered by that agency). 
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Notably, the FFIEC recently issued data security guidance 
requiring large financial institutions64 to implement “enhanced 
standards” for data security.65 This guidance recognizes current 
regulations,66 and mandates that certain large institutions go even 
further.67 Many of the requirements in this guidance are specific and 
technical in nature. One such requirement is that companies establish a 
two-hour Recovery Time Objective (“RTO”), during which they  
recover all compromised data and restore systems in the event of a data 
breach.68 In 2005, the FFIEC  published  The  Interagency  Final 
Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer 
Information and Customer Notice.69 Scholars have criticized this 
publication as only providing limited practical steps, and failing to lay 
out the definitive guidance the industry needs.70 
Some of the most notable regulations at the federal level have 
come in response to the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 
known more commonly as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”). 71 
Title V of the GLBA addresses the potential dangers that financial 
mergers create for non-public consumer information, and requires that 
federal   agencies   establish   administrative,   technical,   and   physical 
 
 
64. Applying to holding companies with total assets exceeding $50 billion, companies 
that manage financial market infrastructure, and nonbank financial companies covered by 
the Federal Reserve Board. Including the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool and the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework. FED. RESERVE SYS., ENHANCED  CYBER  RISK 
MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 11 (Oct.19, 2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20161019a1.pdf. 
65. Id. at 1. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 11 (“Similar to the NIST CSF, the enhanced standards would provide a clear 
set of objectives for sound cyber risk management. However, the binding requirements set 
forth in the enhanced standards would be designed specifically to address the cyber risks of 
the largest, most interconnected U.S. financial entities.”). 
68. Id. at 41. 
69. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized  Access  to 
Customer Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15736 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 30, 208, 225, 364, 568, and 570). 
70. See ALEJANDRO H. CRUZ & CRAIG A. NEWMAN, PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & 
TYLER LLP, OCC’S CYBERSECURITY REGULATORY EXPECTATIONS (Jan. 7, 2016), 
https://datasecuritylaw.com/occs-cybersecurity-regulatory-expectations-a-call-to-action/ 
(explaining how past OCC guidance was primarily found in documents published 
collectively in their capacity as members of the FFIEC). 
71. Financial Services Modernization Act (“Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act”) § 1093(1), 15 
U.S.C.   §  6801  (2015). The   Gramm-Leach-Bliley   Act,   ELEC.  PRIVACY INFO.  CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/glba/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
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controls for protecting this information.72 Specifically, the GLBA 
requires federal agencies to implement safeguards for financial 
institutions that ensure the security of customer information, protect 
against anticipated threats, and prevent unauthorized access that could 
result in substantial harm or inconvenience to customers.73 GLBA was 
amended in 2010 to explicitly exclude the CFPB from the list of 
agencies required to implement the law.74 
The FDIC issued its own data security recommendations in 
1996, three years prior to the passing of the GLBA.75  The jurisdiction   
of the FDIC is broad, extending over all banks and saving associations 
that participate in the FDIC insurance program.76 This agency’s 
guidance has often concerned specific technical issues relevant at the 
time, addressing issues as narrow as the dangers of employee instant 
messaging at banks.77 To monitor cybersecurity, the FDIC utilizes 
regulatory and intelligence reports in addition to identifying issues at 
specific banks through the FDIC examination process.78 The FDIC may 
use enforcement actions against institutions that fail to remedy issues 
identified during these examinations.79  In 2015, the FDIC implemented 
a new Information Technology Risk Examination (“InTREx”) program 
that updates previous examination techniques by placing an increased 
focus on data security, particularly in regard to emerging technologies 
such as mobile banking.80 With approximately two decades of FDIC 
guidance on security, many institutions insured by the FDIC already 
 
 
72. Gramm-Leach Bliley Act § 1093(1), 15 U.S.C. § 6801. 
73.    Id. at § 6801(b). 
74. Id. 
75. Cybersecurity and Information Security: FDIC Financial Institution Letters, FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/risk/it-security.html 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
76. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1814(a) (2015). 
77. See Regulatory Guidance: Cybersecurity and Information Security: FDIC  
Financial Institution Letters, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/risk/it-security.html (listing the specific 
titles of past FDIC letters relating to data security)  (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
78. A Framework for Cybersecurity, 12 SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS 7, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP. (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin15/SI_Winter2015 
.pdf. 
79. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL II-1.1 (Dec. 
2015) https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/2/II-1.1.pdf. 
80. Sacks, supra note 63. 
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have sophisticated data security policies in place.81 
While certainly less involved than the FDIC, the FRB has also 
regulated data security with a strong consumer-based approach.82 The 
FRB’s guidance began in response to the requirements found the 
GLBA.83 These original provisions made no mention of digital threats, 
but more generally instructed covered entities to have written 
information protection plans in place that included physical safeguards 
“appropriate to the size and complexity of the bank and the nature of its 
activities.”84 Beyond this initial guidance, the vast majority of the 
guidance issued by the Federal Reserve has been published in 
cooperation with its FFIEC counterparts.85 
Finally, the OCC has been somewhat active in ensuring data 
security for the national banks and federal savings associations under its 
jurisdiction.86 The OCC  unilaterally  issues  semi-annual  risk 
assessments for federally chartered institutions, which in recent years 
have highlighted data security as a primary concern.87 The most recent 
OCC risk assessment notes that the threat of cyber attack is increasing  
as banks continue to adopt new digital technologies, and goes on to note 
specific dangers, such as criminal use of virtual currencies to hide 
identity.88 Much like its FFIEC counterparts, the majority of recent data 
security  regulation  from  OCC  has  come  in  the  form  of interagency 
 
 
81. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 77 (establishing general procedures that 
businesses should follow in regards to data security). 
82. See Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/topics/info_security.htm (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2017) (listing multiple policy letters relating to customer security). 
83. Id. 
84. INTERAGENCY GUIDELINES ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING 
CUSTOMER INFORMATION, FED. RESERVE SYS. (2001), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2001/sr0115a1.pdf. 
85. Id.; See Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics: Information Security, FED. 
RESERVE BD., https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/topics/info_security.htm (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2017) (listing the policy letters relating to information security published by 
the FFIEC) 
86. About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, https://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
87. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, SEMIANNUAL RISK PERSPECTIVE 7 
(2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications- 
reports/semiannual-risk-perspective/semiannual-risk-perspective-spring-2016.pdf 
(explaining how cyber attacks are one of the primary threats to financial institutions, 
especially large banks). 
88.    Id. at 7–8. 
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FFIEC guidance.89 
In addition to federal regulations, many financial institutions 
must abide by state-issued rules.90 In 2016, the state of New York 
published a proposed rule that, if codified, will make New York the first 
state to regulate data security at financial institutions.91 Some of the  
most noteworthy requirements set forth in the proposal  include 
requiring a written data security program and the designation of a Chief 
Information Security Officer responsible for overseeing data security 
programs and policies.92 These regulations apply to all  financial  
services companies including insurance agencies, with limited 
exceptions for institutions with fewer than 1000 customers or less than 
$10 million in year-end assets.93 Scholars in this field have noted that 
state-level regulations could act to create an overly complex web of 
regulations that could, in some instances, be  self-conflicting.94  
Allowing such state regulations could distract the financial industry, and 
cause more harm than good to consumers.95 To date, there are no other 
proposed state-level regulations for cyber security.96 
While the aforementioned financial agencies have taken 
significant steps to regulate data security, the FTC has long served as  
the primary enforcer in this field.97 Over the course of the last twenty 
years the FTC has successfully brought over sixty data security 
enforcement  actions,  utilizing  jurisdiction  that  extends  to  nearly  all 
 
 
89. Cruz & Newman, supra note 70. 
90. See Who Regulates My Bank?, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, 
https://www.helpwithmybank.gov/national-banks/national-banks.html (last visited Jan. 24, 
2017) (establishing that state chartered banks are also regulated by state regulatory bodies). 
91. Greg Farrell, New York Financial Regulator Rolls Out Cybersecurity Proposals, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2016, 11:55 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016- 
09-13/new-york-financial-regulator-rolls-out-cybersecurity-proposals. 
92. TIFFANY QUACH, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP, NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL 
SERVICES PROPOSES CYBERSECURITY REGULATION (Nov. 7, 2016), 
http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2016/11/articles/cybersecurity/new-york-department-of- 
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93. Kaleigh Simmons, What New York’s Proposed Cybersecurity Regulations Mean  for
 the Rest of the Industry, RIPPLESHOT (Oct. 5, 2016), 
http://info.rippleshot.com/blog/what-new-yorks-proposed-cybersecurity-regulations-mean- 
for-the-rest-of-the-industry. 
94. Germano, supra note 60. 
95. Germano, supra note 60. 
96. See Germano, supra note 60 (describing New York as the only state to consider 
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institutions that manage consumer data.98 
Analyzing the actions of the FTC is particularly useful in this 
context, as the agency’s statutory language governing enforcement is 
nearly identical to that of the CFPB.99 More specifically, both agencies 
have the authority to bring action against parties engaging in unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (“UDAAP”).100 In Dwolla, the 
prohibition on deceptive acts and practices was at issue, and therefore 
analyzing the FTC’s UDAAP actions can be helpful in understanding 
the CFPB’s enforcement action against Dwolla.101 
The FTC began policing consumer data security by focusing on 
its authority to prevent deception,102 targeting an internet company for  
its deceptive collection of user information in 1998.103 Likewise, the 
majority of the FTC’s data security enforcement actions have utilized 
deception as the primary theory.104 The FTC’s utilization of its UDAAP 
authority with regards to data security practices has consistently been 
upheld in federal courts.105 For example, in FTC  v.  Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp.,106 Wyndham challenged an FTC action filed in 
response to a data breach involving 619,000 customer accounts.107 The 
FTC’s evidence indicated that Wyndham failed to use firewalls at 
critical network points, and did not utilize encryption for customer  data 
 
 
98. Woodrow Hartzog and Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data 
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2236 (2016). 
99. MARK TAYLOR, PAYMENTS COMPLIANCE, WHAT DOES THE FIRST CFPB ORDER ON 
DATA SECURITY COMPLIANCE SIGNAL?, 2 (Mar. 16, 2016), 
http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/1082/doc/payments_compliance_- 
_what_does_the_first_cfpb_order_on_data_security_co  .pdf. 
100. FEDERAL RESERVE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT SECTION 5: UNFAIR OR 
DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES 7 (2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf; Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2015). 
101. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a); DWOLLA CONSENT ORDER, supra note 1, 
at 4. 
102. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 628 (2014) (analyzing trends from 154 privacy related 
complaints to form a “common law”). 
103.    Id. at 599. 
104. Id. 
105. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 242–43 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(upholding the FTC’s data security action against Wyndham Worldwide in the absence of 
definitive agency guidance); LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033 *1 (F.T.C. Nov.  
13, 2015). 
106.   Wyndham, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
107.    Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 242-43. 
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files.108 Wyndham claimed that the FTC’s powers over data security 
were too broad, and that Wyndham had not been given “fair notice” that 
such an action could be brought against them.109 Siding with the FTC, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Wyndham did 
in fact have notice as it could “reasonably foresee” UDAAP actions 
brought in response to its poor security practices.110 To determine what 
Wyndham could “reasonably foresee,” the court employed a cost- 
benefit analysis taken from Wyndham’s perspective, where the cost of 
precautions was weighed against the benefits of preventing a breach.111 
In FTC v. LabMD,112 the FTC brought action against LabMD  
for unfairly failing to prevent unauthorized users from accessing patient 
health information.113 In this case LabMD challenged the FTC’s 
jurisdiction by asserting that The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996114 (“HIPAA”) was the only data security 
statute it must comply with.115 This argument failed as  the 
Administrative Court held that, absent direct statutory language, 
agency-specific data security laws do not trump the FTC’s UDAAP 
powers.116 In ruling, the court held that UDAAP powers are intended to 
be broad, defined predominately in the context of FTC precedent.117 
In 2007, the FTC issued a guidebook entitled, Protecting 
Personal Information: A Guide for Business.118 This guidebook 
recommends that companies: avoid collecting nonessential personal 
information, restrict employee access to consumer data, test 
authentication bypass methods, and patch affiliate third-party 
software.119  While this guidance is presented as being non-compulsory, 
 
108. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 256. 
109. Id.; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 98, at 2240. 
110. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 256. 
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112.    LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033 *1 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015). 
113.    LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 776 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir 2015). 
114. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) § 264(a), 
42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(2) (2015). 
115. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 98, at 2243; Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s 
Motion to Dismiss at *9, LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 
2015). 
116.    Id. at *11. 
117.    Id. at *12. 
118. See F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 
FTC guidance published in 2007). 
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the Wyndham court considered the guidebook as evidence against 
Wyndham’s “fair notice” argument.120 While formal  FTC  guidance 
could benefit the industry, scholars have noted that a “case-by-case 
approach” is better suited for dealing with the dynamic issues associated 
with data security.121 
The CFPB has consistently relied upon its UDAAP powers as  
its primary enforcement tool.122 The popularity of this tool can be 
attributed partly to the large amount of discretion implicit in this broad 
statutory language.123 While deception was the only prong of UDAAP 
utilized by the CFPB in Dwolla, observers have predicted that, based on 
FTC precedent, future actions will likely utilize the unfairness prong.124 
Unlike the deceptive prong, Dodd-Frank provides specific explicit 
definitions for “unfair” and “abusive” practices.125 Unfairness is found 
in situations where the act “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury 
to consumers, and in cases where the injury is not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”126 Abusive 
practices are defined as those that “materially interfere with the ability 
of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial 
product or service,” and therefore take unreasonable advantage of the 
consumer’s expectations and understanding.127 
While Dodd-Frank does not formally define “deceptive,” the 
agency has published enforcement manuals describing this term as a 
“representation, omission, act, or practice that is likely to mislead the 
consumer.”128 The CFPB enforcement manual also holds that evidence 
of a consumer already being misled is not required, rather the agency 
must simply prove that the practice is likely to mislead “reasonable 
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consumers.”129  The CFPB utilizes the “four Ps” test to evaluate whether 
a policy is likely to mislead reasonable consumers.130 For a written 
statement, this test focuses on the prominence of the statement, how the 
information is presented, the placement of the information, and the 
statement’s proximity to the claim it qualifies.131 Furthermore, a 
subsequent truthful disclosure is not sufficient to cure a deceptive act or 
promise that occurred in the past.132 The CFPB’s enforcement guide for 
deceptive acts and practices cites the FTC’s Policy Statement on 
Deception.133 
In addition to overlapping enforcement statutes, the CFPB and 
the FTC also have overlapping areas of jurisdiction.134 The  two  
agencies have multiple Memoranda of Mutual Understanding  
(“MoUs”), in which they lay out the intricacies of their jurisdictional 
overlap.135 Included in their shared powers is the ability to bring 
enforcement actions against nonbank providers of financial products.136 
These MoUs are intended to prevent duplicative rulemaking and 
enforcement.137 These documents also acknowledge that in some 
circumstances it may be best that the two agencies coordinate their 
enforcement activities.138 To prevent duplicative actions, these MoUs 
require a “notice of commencement of investigation” in which the 
agencies notify one another of actions that could potentially fall within 
their overlapping areas of jurisdiction.139 While these notices are not 
public record, it is likely that the CFPB notified FTC of its Dwolla 
investigation, as this company seems to fall under the jurisdiction of 
both organizations.140 
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IV. DWOLLA’S IMPACT MOVING FORWARD 
 
Dodd-Frank does not explicitly require the CFPB to regulate 
data security.141 The CFPB’s expansion into data security, therefore, 
represents an evolution of the “in connection”142 language found in 
Section 1031(a) of Dodd-Frank.143 In this case, the deceptive data 
statements were “in connection” with the financial services that Dwolla 
provided consumers via its payment network.144 
One of the biggest questions Dwolla raises is how the CFPB  
will work alongside the FTC in enforcing data security.145  While the  
two agencies have acknowledged their overlapping powers, neither has 
gone as far as to claim exclusive jurisdiction over a specific industry.146 
It is difficult to know whether the CFPB will act merely to supplement 
the data security policies the FTC pursues, or whether the CFPB will 
implement a different agenda.147 For now, it is fair  for  companies 
subject to overlapping jurisdiction to assume that they may face 
enforcement actions from either or both agencies.148 
Companies subject to overlapping jurisdiction should take note 
of Dwolla, as the CFPB examination powers are far superior to those 
held by the FTC.149  These powers apply to all “entities and individuals 
 
141. See ARNOLD AND PORTER, supra note 20, at 1 (describing the areas of the economy 
over which the CFPB was delegated authority). 
142. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
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the CFPB’s examiners). 
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that engage in offering or providing a consumer financial product or 
service.”150 Companies meeting this description are required to grant 
CFPB examiners access to a wide range of information including 
internal policies, audit reports, and training materials.151 In addition to 
being able to access these documents, examiners have the right to go on-
site to conduct interviews and review documents relevant to their 
investigations.152 CFPB examiners may also direct covered entities to 
adjust their practices through a separate informal process.153  During   
this process, the CFPB examiner shares the findings of his or her 
investigation with the institution, and makes recommendations on how 
to remedy  identified issues.154  While the CFPB prefers self-correction 
of these issues, some circumstances require enforcement actions.155 In 
this regard, the CFPB’s powers are broader than those of the FTC, 
which is generally limited to issuing civil investigative demands.156 In 
addition to broader examination powers, the CFPB can also assess 
monetary penalties for any UDAAP violation, unlike the FTC, which 
can only issue fines in a limited set of circumstances.157 
The CFPB’s decision to exercise its powers against Dwolla also 
introduces a host of questions.158 The CFPB covers thousands of 
companies, some of which likely have similar deceptive data security 
statements in place.159  The choice of Dwolla as the first target of its  
kind could be motivated by a desire to put companies in the quickly 
growing fintech industry on notice.160   The lack of breach or  attempted 
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breach in Dwolla could alternatively signal that the CFPB is focusing 
more broadly on ensuring covered entities have comprehensive policies, 
even in the absence of specific security threats.161 There have been 
recent FTC complaints filed against Credit Karma and Fandango where 
deceptive data security practices were also prosecuted without  
breach.162 The facts of these cases are similar in that the FTC asserted 
that these companies had put customers at risk by misrepresenting their 
security policies and failing to take the steps needed to secure their 
customer’s information.163 
The CFPB’s choice to enforce data security prior to releasing 
guidance is also potentially strategic.164 As previously mentioned, the 
court in Wyndham placed significant value in informal guidance 
documents published by the FTC.165 However, creating CFPB-specific 
guidance could be problematic, as it would likely conflict with the data 
security policies already listed in other examples of agency-specific 
guidance.166 Scholars have noted that formal guidance  is  not  well- 
suited to address the highly dynamic nature of data security issues.167 
The CFPB may therefore intentionally avoid issuing meaningful 
guidance, and continue to establish precedent through enforcement 
actions such as this.168  The relatively meager nature of the fine issued   
to Dwolla could signal that this action was intended to serve such an 
informal guidance role.169 
 
161. See, We Are Never Done, DWOLLA (Mar. 2, 2016), 
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The preventative approach to data security endorsed by the 
CFPB in Dwolla may very well be the most cost-effective, long-term 
solution for financial institutions.170 Studies have reinforced the notion 
that proactive measures reduce overall costs.171 For example, having a 
data security team in place can reduce the average cost of breach by 
10%, as the company saves significant funds on costly post-breach, 
third-party remediation.172 The employee training and planning 
techniques endorsed in Dwolla have also been proven to reduce breach 
costs.173 
Companies covered by the CFPB could also benefit from 
following the National Institute of Standards and Technologies 
(“NIST”) framework.174 NIST is an organization housed within the 
Department of Commerce, which works to provide American industry 
with tools and guides that facilitate both efficiency and productivity.175 
The FTC has acknowledged NIST’s framework as consistent with both 
its guidance and its enforcement actions.176 At its core, the framework 
has five functions: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.177 
While these steps are broad, they encompass the notion that companies 
need to be both proactive and reactive in their efforts to protect data.178 
“Identify” includes using data to determine where and how different 
security threats will develop.179 “Protect”  includes  taking  proactive 
steps such as increasing employee awareness, and developing security 
safeguards in delivery  of  services.180  “Detect”  concerns  the 
identification  of attacks, and the FTC has brought many  actions  based 
 
 
170. See PONEMON INST., 2016 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY  9  (June  2016) 
(establishing that data loss prevention technologies reduce the cost of a data breach), 
https://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en/sel03094usen/SEL03094USEN.PDF. 
171. IBM, supra note 6 at 9. 
172. IBM, supra note 6, at 9. 
173. IBM, supra note 6, at 9. (concluding that employee training reduces the overall 
costs of a breach by 7% per capita and having BCM measures in place reduces the costs by 
about 6% per capita). 
174. Andrea Arias, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the FTC, F.T.C. BUS. BLOG 
(Aug. 31, 2016, 6:36 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business- 
blog/2016/08/nist-cybersecurity-framework-ftc. 
175. About NIST, NIST, https://www.nist.gov/about-nist (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
176. Arias, supra note 174. 
177. Arias, supra note 174. 
178. Arias, supra note 174. 
179. Arias, supra note 174. 
180. Arias, supra note 174. 
  
 
 
296 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE          [Vol. 21 
on companies’ failure in this area.181 Finally, “respond” and “recover” 
both address the steps companies should have in place to mitigate 
damage after a breach has occurred.182 Past FTC actions have stressed 
the importance of consumer interests in recovery, which can include 
promptly notifying customers about what information has been 
compromised.183 Somewhat ironically,  the  CFPB’s  internal  data 
security programs have been analyzed and held to NIST standards by 
the Office of Inspector General for the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System.184 
Companies can also reduce their potential exposure by simply 
not collecting personal information.185 While the nature of the financial 
industry often necessitates the collection of such information,  
companies could limit the amount of personal information by adopting 
technologies such as OAuth.186 This technology provides temporary 
access to personal information stored by social networking companies, 
(e.g., Facebook profile information) thereby limiting the quantity of 
information needed for customer registration.187 
To avoid deception violations, financial institutions must be 
careful when drafting privacy policies and other documents that will be 
distributed to customers.188 As long as the CFPB is acting on the 
deception prong alone, companies can protect themselves by avoiding 
misleading security statements.189 This could be as easy as telling 
consumers in disclaimers that “we cannot guarantee absolutely that your 
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information will never be subject to a breach.”190 If companies prefer to 
make a guarantee about data security, they should avoid grandiose 
statements such as those made by Dwolla, as these are far more likely to 
be flagged for possible deception.191 This implicates a balancing act 
where companies must craft statements that give their customers 
sufficient confidence, while not creating liability.192 Attorneys in the 
field have noted that to be taken seriously, companies must at least 
portray that their policies meet industry standards.193 
Shortly after the CFPB’s enforcement action, Dwolla published  
a blog post about its data security policies entitled “We Are Never 
Done.”194 In the post, Dwolla concedes that “we may not have chosen 
the best language and comparisons to describe some of our  
capabilities,” and that “it has never been the company’s intent to  
mislead anyone on critical issues like data security.”195 Dwolla also 
emphasized that its customers’ accounts have never been breached.196 
The post concludes with a brief description of the encryption methods 
utilized by Dwolla, including a promise that Dwolla will never stop 
pursuing security for customers.197 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Agency focus on data security is likely to grow as the threat and 
scope of cyber attacks increase.198 The CFPB is not the first to police 
data security, but the agency’s strong enforcement tools and focus on 
consumer protection make it a formidable regulator.199 While  the 
Dwolla consent order provides some useful guidance, uncertainty 
remains  the  prevailing  theme.    The  decision  to  bring  action against 
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Dwolla may have been strategic, but without further enforcement 
actions it is impossible to discern the CFPB’s regulatory priorities in  
this field.200 The election of President Donald J. Trump has created 
further uncertainty, as his administration has expressed plans to make 
broad changes to the CFPB’s personnel.201 Until clarification is  
provided in the form of further enforcement actions or guidance, 
financial institutions should utilize both FTC precedent and the Dwolla 
consent order to assess the adequacy of their data security policies.202 
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